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Targeted Economic Development: Its Role in
Maine Economic Policy
Carla Dickstein
Editors ' Note: Although this article is about targeted economic development in Maine, we feel that its
findings are pertinent to conditions here in North Carolina, especially considering the present reality
of welfare reform. In the previous article, we considered various approaches to helping people move
from public assistance, unemployment, and underemployment to decent jobs. Targeted economic
development is another strategy that planners and community and economic developers in North Carolina
and other Southeastern states may want to add to their toolbox ofjob development strategies to help
people make these transitions.
D t"espite the magnitude and growth of economic
disparities in Maine, equity concerns have been a poor
stepchild in most economic development policies that
focus on general business development and improving
the economic infrastructure and busmess climate. 1
Slowly, the economic development policy debate
is shifting toward equity concerns. Some of the
benchmarks recently established by the Maine
Economic Growth Council reflect the equity goals
of reducing regional and income disparities. 2 There
also have been recent legislative efforts to tie
economic development dollars to social paybacks. 3
Finally, welfare reform and the current emphasis on
welfare-to-work are forcing discussion about where
welfare recipients will find work.
Perhaps the biggest opportunity for influencing
public policy is the recent attention ofthe mainstream
press to the changing economic order and its
widespread impacts. Increasing polarization of
income, the rise in contingent labor, corporate
downsizing, huge disparities in compensation
between chief executive officers and workers, and
even the sweatshops that produce celebrity-label
clothing have been known for years. But now these
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economic and social justice issues are surfacing as
part of the public's world view and can be raised in
public discourse Again it is legitimate to ask these
questions: Who wins and loses in the present economy?
What is the role of economic development in altering
that equation? And, how can economic development
dollars have the greatest social impact?
This article examines the role of targeted
economic development strategies in accomplishing
explicit equity goals. It argues that traditional
economic development programs that support
business development and economic growth are
insufficient for creating quality jobs, especially for
people on public assistance. Targeted strategies are
needed to link these people directly to employment
opportunities. The article draws on lessons learned
from current practices at Coastal Enterprises, Inc., a
community development corporation with a nearly
twenty-year history of working with businesses and
communities m Maine.
Limitations of Traditional Economic
Development Programs
To date, the dominant focus ofeconomic development
policy and practice has been on creating a conducive
environment for businesses to grow and prosper (Blair
1995). The assumption has been that the benefits of
this growth would trickle down to all segments of
society through more jobs, lower unemployment,
higher wages, and an increased tax base. Government
intervention would come primarily through
investments in physical infrastructure, education and
14
CAROLINA PLANNING
training; a favorable regulatory- and tax emironment;
and direct business assistance programs.
However, the extent to which benefits do trickle
down, particularly to the poor, is increasingly in
question. (See Seguino 1995 for a review of the
literature). Income inequality in Maine widened
during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1979, the top 20
percent of Maine households earned, on average, eight
times as much as the bottom 20 percent; by 1994,
they were earning 10 times as much. Between 1979
and 1 994, the top one-fifth ofMaine households gained
an average of S 1 2 for every $ 1 earned by the bottom
one-fifth(Blom and Garber 1996)
Although the poor did not fare much better during
the high-growth periods of the 1950s and 1960s, at
least labor shared m business prosperity during that
period and the social contract was alive and well for
workers and their families. That is not the case today.
Real wages have fallen for most workers, 4 and
jobs that pay a liveable wage are in short supply
in Maine. The Department of Labor's 1996 "Job
Gap" study found that only 27 percent of the net
job openings filled in 1993 and 1994 paid a
liveable wage of at least SI 1.5 5 per hour, and
that there were 10 job seekers for every
liveable-wage job. 5 Of these liveable-wage jobs,
63 percent required more than two years of
training or experience.
Explanations for the increasing income gap and
wage deterioration point to structural changes in the
economy, such as the increasing substitution of
technology for labor in both manufacturing and
service sectors; the trend towards part-time,
contingent labor rather than full-time employees; the
decline of unions; and the
rising profits demanded by
very competitive financial
markets. 6 These structural
changes create even greater
barriers for moving welfare
recipients, especially women,
into jobs that pay liveable
wages (Seguino 1996).
Efforts to move welfare
recipients into the workforce
have focused on education and training programs, as
well as various subsidies to employers. Unfortunately,
a focus on improving skills through education, training,
and job coaching does not necessarily give the poor
access to good jobs, because employers turn to
established networks for recruiting workers. The
Targeted interventions
must go beyond
incentives to proactively
link people with jobs.
those networks.
Even demand-side interventions such as tax
credits, on-the-job training subsidies, and direct cash
payments to employers have noi been successful in
enticing employers to hire welfare recipients, especially
in a depressed economy-. Evaluations of these types
of subsidies have concluded that they often go unused.
Most employers who do take advantage of them use
them to fill unskilled, low-wage, and limited-benefit
jobs. It has also been concluded that employers would
have hired most of the workers filling these positions
without the subsidies." Furthermore, an employer
subsidy actually may work as a hiring disincentive if
firms believe welfare recipients inherently are less
productive. 8
The Role of Targeted Development
The primary purpose of targeted development
models, as defined here, is to reduce poverty- by
linking people with low incomes and on public
assistance to good jobs. Such programs also
may target workers displaced by layoffs or
defense downsizing to prevent their becoming
impoverished Giloth (1995) describes the
process as the combination of "employment
training, human services, and enterprise
development to enhance access to and creation
of jobs, careers, and self-sufficiency for the
disadvantaged."
Iftargeted interventions are to succeed, they must
go beyond incentives to proactively link people with
jobs. The more depressed the economy, the more
leverage is needed with employers to access quality'
jobs. Community-based
organizations are among the
most successful organizations
in making these linkages
(Harrison 1994). Instead of
trying to bring development to
distressed communities, these
organizations broker jobs
already in the region to the
people in need. For example,
in Kansas City, Missouri, a
unique coalition of corporate, nonprofit, labor, and
neighborhood members called the Local Investment
Commission has gamed national recognition by
performing this broker role. The commission uses
welfare and food stamp payments as a wage
supplement (equal to S3.05 per hour) to encourage
poorest people lack the skills and know-how to work employers to hire welfare recipients for permanent
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jobs that offer regular pay increases and bonuses.
Federal and state agencies provide Medicaid benefits,
child care, and other support to welfare recipients for
up to four years. Unlike other wage-subsidy programs,
the commission actively uses the influence of its
volunteer Business and Economic Committee to find
willing employers.
Gap financing programs are an underused leverage
point to link low-income people tojobs created through
business start-ups or expansions. Gap financing
programs are important to companies that cannot
access conventional sources of bank financing. In
Maine, more than $ 1 30 million is available annually in
small-business loan guarantees and direct loans
(Roundy, forthcoming). Such financing programs could
require that businesses hire welfare recipients or other
low-income people in order to secure financing.
In practice, however, few economic development
programs in Maine and throughout the nation use
financing to encourage employers to hire people with
low incomes and on public assistance. To add the goal
ofjob creation for targeted populations to conventional
economic development financing is considered
complex and a possible deterrent to business
development (Bartik 1993). Another critique is that
targetingjob creation to the disadvantaged will displace
other qualified people who, in turn, become
disadvantaged.
The counter-argument has been that workers with
a long-term employment history have developed the
necessary skills to find other jobs or to create their
own. Although little or no research has been done to
document displacement effects, it is unlikely that
targeted strategies are a zero-sum game resulting in
high displacement of the existing workforce. 9
CEI's Approach to Targeted Development
Coastal Enterprises Incorporated (CEI) has had
experience with targeted development programs and
evaluation since 1984. 10 CEI's mission as a
community development corporation is to help
disadvantaged people and communities reach equitable
standards of living, working, and learning. Creating
jobs through small-business financing and counseling
has been CEI's primary vehicle for assisting people
and communities in need. In recent years, CEI has
also engaged in affordable housing, social services,
and facility development.
CEI targets its financing programs to assist firms
that fulfill specific targeted development goals. It does
this by screening the larger small businesses—those
having more than four people, and with loans or
investments of more than $25,000—to assess their
economic viability and the number of quality jobs
accessible to people with low mcomes. CEI then acts
as a broker to link those jobs to people in the welfare
and employment-training systems. The process
includes targeting promising firms and sectors with
quality jobs (Dickstein 1996) and linking jobs to firms
through an Employment and Training Agreement as
part of the financing agreement.
The Employment and Training Agreement
CEI has developed an Employment and Training
Agreement to give welfare recipients and others with
low incomes access to jobs created in the companies
it finances. While making a loan or investment, CEI
conducts an employment assessment to screen
whether the company will create quality jobs suitable
for people on public assistance or with low incomes.
At a minimum, these jobs should pay $6.50 to $8 per
hour and offer health benefits and opportunities for
skill development and mobility. (A study ofcompanies
in CEI's loan portfolio shows the average wage is
$9.30 per hour, well above that point [LaPlante 1996].)
The agreement creates an employment plan in
Coastal Enterprises, Inc.
Coastal Enterprises Incorporated (CEI) presently manages $25 million in funds that provide subordinated
debt and equity to a variety of Maine small businesses that cannot access conventional financing. Just
recently it launched Maine's first social investment fund. Coastal Ventures Limited Partnership, to
provide small-scale equity capital primarily to Maine firms. This fund, initially capitalized at $3.3
million, is expected to grow to between $5 and $7 million. In addition to financing, CEI operates a
Small Busmess Assistance Center that houses a subcenter of the state's Small Business Development
Center system.
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The Employment and Training Agreement in Practice: the Example ofSoleras
Soleras Inc., an environmentally-responsible precision metal manufacturing company in Biddeford, Maine,
is an outstanding example of a successful Employment and Training Agreement. During the seventeen
months from October 1993 through February 1995, Soleras filled twenty-three jobs with low-income
people, including twelve Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients. Twenty-one of
these people are still employed with Soleras, while one quit and one was fired. Starting wages ranged
from $6.50 to $8.00 an hour depending on experience, with an average starting hourly wage of $7.24.
Most new employees received wage increases within the first three months of employment. Current
hourly wages range from $7.65 to $14.15, with an average of $9.71. All employees are eligible for
medical and dental insurance, paid holidays, vacation, life insurance, the company pension plan, and full
tuition for educational courses These benefits are critical to ensure that welfare recipients can complete
the transition from public assistance.
The Soleras employees had higher education, more children, and longer histories of receiving AFDC
than the average in Maine. Only 50 percent were women, compared to 96 percent of the state's AFDC
recipients. Conventional indicators of a successful transition to work, such as education or previous
work experience, were not always accurate predictors of employee performance. One of the star
participants was a young woman who had received AFDC benefits for eight years. Another man with an
unkempt appearance and a revoked driver's license surprised his managers with his motivation and
loyalty and was able to reinstate his license.
In interviews conducted in 1995 with Soleras' new employees, all reported their financial
situations were improving as a result of full-time employment (Rutstein 1995). Many still faced large
debts as they struggled to become financially independent, and transitional support services from the
state were critical for them. The transition to work had a positive impact on most employees' personal
lives and on their families. Even though they spent less time with their families, the trade-off was
worthwhile. Some even thought the quality of time together unproved. They felt better about themselves
and were more patient with their children.
The Employment and Training Agreement made a difference in Soleras's willingness to
hire people on AFDC. Although Soleras had a strong culture supporting human resource
development, the management initially was concerned about the quality of referrals coming
through the project. CEI staff worked hard to screen good applicants and to provide employees
with the training they needed to do a good job. The on-site training program provided participants
with basic machining skills and allowed Soleras management to screen prospective employees. As the
working relationships became more comfortable, Soleras made direct contact with the job-training
agencies and institutionaUzed hiring low-income people as part of the normal course of doing business.
conjunction with the company's business plan. It is a motivated to succeed on the job. Even those with the
legal commitment that companies accept upon closing greatest personal barriers to employment have
the loan, but in reality ft works primarily through the succeeded. Unlike other workers, they have external
mutual interests and good faith of both parties. When support services already in place to help them cope
job openings arise, CEI notifies potential candidates with economic or family crises that arise. 11 Several
through the welfare and training systems and brokers firms have found workers on public assistance better
available training and apprenticeship resources. Most prepared for the workplace than their current labor
important, CEI works with the welfare and force.
employment-training systems to screen quality Since 1984, CEI has implemented more than 125
applicants for their aptitude and interest in the job, Employment and Training Agreements and can
thus saving businesses recruiting costs. document the successful placement of at least 1,539
Businesses also can test workers through on-site low-income people (as defined by federal poverty
training periods. Contrary to the stereotype of public guidelines issued by the Department of Health and
assistance recipients, they are not by definition more Human Services) in jobs with Maine small businesses,
costly to employ than other workers
. Many are highly The agreements with many ofCEI 's higher-technology
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companies require training partners at technical
colleges and secondary vocational schools that
have candidates with higher-level skills than those
who come through the state's shorter-term
welfare-to-work training programs.
CEI has found that gap financing, especially if
combined with training resources, can be a
powerful tool for linking welfare recipients and
others with low income to better quality jobs. The
financing establishes a relationship between CEI
and the firms, while the Employment and Training
Agreement is a mechanism for exactmg social
paybacks and greater public accountability in
exchange for access to high-risk financing. Firms
find that the benefits extend beyond the gap
financing. Businesses often exceed targets for
hiring low-income workers. Six firms have
continued to work with CEI even after their loans
were paid off and the agreement was no longer in
effect.
Welfare-to-Work Demonstration Projects
CEI's Employment and Training Agreement
has become a model for the design of the Job
Opportunities for Low Income Individuals Program
administered by the Office of Community Services
at the federal Department of Health and Human
Services. CEI has won four grants through this
program to provide direct training support to AFDC
recipients and place them either in jobs CEI's
businesses create or in self-employment
opportunities. These projects are collaborative
efforts among economic development, education,
andjob-training organizations to provide customized
skill training, workforce literacy training, peer
support, entrepreneurial training, business
assistance and mentoring, child care, and other
services.
Two of these projects have been completed,
and evaluations by the Margaret Chase Smith
Center for Public Policy showed that the strategy
to create unsubsidized employment through
placement in businesses was successful (Margaret
Chase Smith Center 1995). In the project,
Structured Opportunities for AFDC Recipients,
average starting wages in firms with an
Employment and Training Agreement were $6.71
per hour, compared to $5.96 an hour for
non-participating firms. The vast majority of
participants placed m compames with agreements
received raises, with their average hourly wage
Welfare-to Work Demonstration Project
Project SOAR (Structured Opportunities for
AFDC Recipients), 199 1-1 994, employed
forty-three of seventy AFDC participants in
Androscoggin County with jobs brokered by CEI
and placed another nine in self-employment
opportunities. At the end of the project, fifty-two
participants were off AFDC. thirty-five were in
non-traditional occupations, and five were in
registered apprenticeships.
Project JUMP (Jobs for Unemployed Maine
Parents), 1992-1995, in York County employed
thirty-nine of seventy-three AFDC/low-income
JOBS (Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training)
participants in York County and helped another
fourteen become self-employed. At the end of
the project, fifty ofthe participants were offAFDC
and five others were m non-traditional occupations.
Project Pioneer, 1994-1997, targeted job
placements through a planned expansion ofPioneer
Plastics Corporation in Auburn. The program
officer worked on site at Pioneer with the human
resources manager to provide customized adult
education courses and non-traditional occupational
training and skills-training programs.
The project also explored the feasibility ofa child
care center and transportation services that would
be supported by several employers for the benefit
of second- and third-shift project participants, the
project employed thirty-four of sixty-six AFDC/
low-income participants at Pioneer and other
businesses; fifteen were offAFDC and twenty-six
were off food stamps.
Project POWER (Promotion of Welfare
Employment Resources), 1995-1998, assists a
for-profit company, Employment Trust, Inc.,
essentially by acting as an employee leasing
company to integrate ninety-two participants from
York and Cumberland counties into the workplace,
support them through the transition off federal
assistance, and move them on to the business "s
payroll and into jobs that lead to economic
self-sufficiency. In the first year, POWER has
employed nine of thirty-one AFDC/low-income
participants full time, and three part time.
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rising to $7.58. A 1996 follow-up survey of project
participants revealed that twenty-seven of the
thirty-six respondents were employed in companies
had health benefits.
In a similar project, Jobs for Unemployed Maine
Parents, the average hourly wage was $8.08 for CEI
companies versus $7.10 for non-CEI companies at
the end of the project. Twenty-four of the thirty-nine
project participants placed in companies had health
benefits. These wages and health benefits compare
favorably to those achieved by AFDC recipients and
participants in the Department of Human Services"
ASPIRE program. Maine's employment education and
training program for AFDC recipients. The average
hourly wage of Maine AFDC recipients surveyed in
1995 was $5.37; only 13.1 percent were covered by
employer-provided health insurance (Seguino 1995 and
1995a). Graduates of the ASPIRE program between
July 1995 and January 1996 earned an average wage
of only $6 per hour in full-time work and $5.23 for
part-time work. Only 24 percent of full-time workers
and four percent of part-time workers in Maine had
health insurance (ASPIRE-JOBS Full Time and Part
Time Employment 1996, cited in Hastedt.
forthcoming).
More importantly, are these workers earning
liveable wages 9 Seguino (1995a) estimated that an
average hourly wage of $1 1.55 is needed to meet a
basic needs budget. 12 However, Seguino's estimates
assume that employees cover their own health care
costs. The liveable wage would be less if the
employer provided health care. A recent study
ofcompanies in CEFs loan portfolio (La Plante 1996)
found that more than 80 percent of CEI-financed
companies provided health insurance for full-time
workers. More, longer-term data are needed on wage
progression and benefits for participants to determine
wage adequacy. Finally, one of the intangible
outcomes of these projects is the increased
self-confidence and self-esteem among participants
that enabled them to seek training and work (Hurrell
1996; Margaret Chase Smith Center 1996).
Changes in Business Behavior
CEFs targeted development programs have had a
direct impact on changing business attitudes and
behavior towards hiring low-income people and
welfare recipients The welfare-to-work programs, as
well as interviews with other CEI companies, reflect
a common experience: people on public assistance
or with low incomes are excellent employees if
properly trained and provided with the necessary
support services, such as transportation and child care
(Brennick 1995). Attitudinal data from CEFs recent
social and economic impact study of its loan and
investment portfolio provide further support that CEI
played an "important" or '"very important" role in
more than 80 percent of the firms that had made
'"some" or "significant" progress toward hiring
low-income people (69 percent of respondents) since
receiving CEI financing (LaPlante 1996).
Costs Compared to Benefits
Despite the benefits of these programs, the question
invariably arises of whether they are sustainable in
the long term. Do the benefits outweigh the costs?
No cost-benefit studies of CEFs demonstration and
targeting programs have been done. Costs need to be
compared to long-term program benefits, such as the
quality of jobs and wage adequacy over time, the
degree of self-sufficiency and reduction of transfer
payments, and the innumerable tangible and
intangible benefits to individuals and their families.
The savings for one person who transitions off public
assistance (not including administrative costs for
welfare programs) is estimated at approximately
$8,500 per year depending upon child care and
Medicaid costs.
Compared to earlier national evaluations of
welfare-to-work programs, CEFs programs fall into
a category of programs that provide intensive
educational, training, and job development
sendees (Gueron and Pauly 1991). These programs
generally have been shown to be most effective in
getting selected participants into higher-paying jobs
but have been less effective in reducing welfare
expenditures per dollar invested (Gueron and Pauly
1991).
CEFs unique approach to linking welfare
recipients directly to available jobs may create
stronger results. A recent evaluation of California's
comprehensive welfare-to-work program, Greater
Avenues for Independence, suggests the direct link
for program participants to job creationmay have been
an important reason the community of Riverside
achieved greater success than others. The program's
message about employment and the active use ofjob
development to establish a close link to private-sector
employers may have enhanced the benefits of other
program components, such as job search, basic
education, and vocational education and training, in
Riverside (Riccio, Friedlander, and Freedman 1994).
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Policy Implications
State agencies are now attempting to link their training
programs directly to real jobs in order to create work
opportunities for the unemployed and people on
welfare. The Maine Department of Labor is
coordinating its services with the state's economic
development programs to provide '"one-stop
shopping" for companies. It also will give preference,
when using the Governor's Training Initiative funds,
to companies that train the economically
disadvantaged, including welfare recipients. The
Department of Health and Human Services has
created a job development position in southern Maine
to contact businesses, sell the department's training
services, and place ASPIRE participants in jobs.
Although these are important directions, state
agencies could go further. Usmg CEI's Employment
and Training Agreement as a model, they could target
a percentage of jobs to low-income and welfare
recipients as part of the quid pro quo of receiving
financing from state economic development agencies
and other state-financed local and regional
financing programs.
However, even if state policy were to initiate
employment agreements modeled after CEI. questions
would remain about how well such agreements can
be institutionalized on a larger scale. Effective
targeting and brokering of jobs on a statewide basis
require both micro and macro factors: an ability
to work with companies and pull together various
resources and an adequate supply of quality jobs for
the targeted population.
CEI has learned several lessons from its
experience in targeted development that can inform
policy and practice:
Targeted development requires staff who
understand company needs.
Staff need to interpret whether poor company
performance on targeting goals reflects a lack
of will or external economic forces. Good working
relationships between staff and businesses are based
on trust, not sanctions. At the same time, targeting
will not happen without active monitoring ofcompany
agreements.
Targeted development incurs additional upfront
costs compared to traditional approaches to
development.
Imtial costs include training, support, and brokering
services for targeted populations The brokering costs,
such as in CEI's Employment and Training Agreement
model, are a small portion of the total costs but an
important piece that makes targeting effective
The greater the desired impact from targeting, the
more time and resources are required to gather
information on companies, services, clients, and
results.
The optimal program requires more research focused
on the front-end costs oftargeted development as well
as the long-term quantifiable and intangible impacts
for welfare recipients, their families, and the regional
economy.
In the best scenarios, AFDC recipients are
employed in jobs that pay liveable wages and
eventually become self-sufficient. The second-best
outcome is that targeted development offers them an
opportunity for training, developing self-esteem and
self-confidence, and gaining work experience, while
reducing net welfare expenditures. Although they may
not be totally self-sufficient in the short run, the work
experience creates higher incomes and a future
of moving towards self-sufficiency.
Targeted development policies depend on the
overall number of quality jobs created in the state
economy.
The shortage of quality jobs within reach of
welfare recipients, even with customized
education and training, is a limiting factor. Economic
development policies must continue to address how
more, better-paying jobs can be created, not only by
targeting specific high-paying sectors, but also by
targeting firms that offer employees a financial stake
in their firms. Companies that create quality jobs
should have priority in state economic development
policy. <H>
Endnotes
1 Kossy (1996) argues that during the last decade economic
development practice moved away from equity and
poverty concerns because of the decline in federal
funding and the increased reliance on state and local
funding. Roundy's 1996 paper that attempts to
quantify tlie various economic development funding
streams in Maine suggests that general funding far
outweighs targeted funds, although the paper does
not specifically quantify targeted programs.
Furthermore, Roundy acknowledges his figures do
not include the millions of dollars of investments made
in economic development infrastructure, such as
transportation.
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2 Examples include the goal for the average per capita
personal income in the poorest counties to achieve 75
percent of the average per capita income of the
wealthiest counties by 2005, and the goal for the ten-
vear growth rate in income for the poorest one-fifth
of Maine families to exceed the ten-year growth rate
in income for the wealthiest one-fifth of families. (See
Maine Development Foundation 1996).
3 Examples include the Employment Tax Increment
Financing program, which requires companies receiving
tax credits to create at least 1 5 jobs with health benefits,
pensions, and wages above the per capita income for
the labor market area, and the Governor's Trainmg
Initiative that authorizes the Commissioner of Labor to
develop standards to encourage high-quality job
creation and expansion.
4 Blom and Garber's 1996 research on the Maine income
gap found that "The average pay m a Maine household
making less than $30,000 a year—roughly half the
population—declmed from 1989 to 1994." According
to the Economic Policy Institute (1996), "Wages have
fallen since the 1980s among men, younger workers,
and the 75 percent of the workforce without a four-year
college degree. . . . From the mid-1980s to the
mid-1990s, even high-wage, white-collar and
college-educated men saw their wages fall or stagnate."
5 The liveable wage is based on Stephanie Seguino's article
(1995a) that estimates household budgets to meet the
basic needs of a three-person single-parent family.
Seguino considers households with two children under
6; those with only one of the children under 6; and
those with two children over 6 An hourly rate of $1 1.55
represents the average. Segumo's hourly estimates
include expenditures for health care.
6 Blom (April 28, 1996) cites Edward Wolff, a New York
University economist, who says, "The run-up of stock
prices, particularly in the 1990s, is through rising
profitability of businesses." To a large extent, these
profits result from keepmg wages low.
7 See the evaluation of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
program (U.S. Department of Labor, 1994) and the
evaluation of the job-training programs by the
Manpower Research Development Corporation
(Auspos and Long 1988; Freedman and Cabe 1988).
8 A controlled experiment of AFDC recipients' job-search
activities in Dayton, Ohio in the early 1 980s showed
that those offering cash vouchers and tax-credit
vouchers actually had a poorer job placement record
than those who did not identify themselves as AFDC
recipients. (Burtless, 1985).
9 Conversation with Timothy Bartik at the Upjohn Institute,
July 1995.
10 CEI's Small Business Finance and Employment Training
Project which began in 1934 was a successful
demonstration of the targeted development model. See
the evaluation by McDonald (1986) at the Center for
Research and Advanced Study at the University of
Southern Maine.
1
1
CEI's experience confirms Bartik's (1993) assumptions
that customized business assistance programs and
pre-screening of low-mcome applicants can overcome
the stigma problem.
12 See note 5 above.
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Call for Papers
Carolina Planning is currently accepting articles and artwork for the Summer 1998 issue. Topics
should be relevant to practicing planners in the southeastern United States. We print many different
types ofarticles, including analysis ofplanning issues, case studies, opinion pieces, and short descriptions
ofinnovative planning projects.
Submission guidelines: Manuscripts should be up to 25 typed, double-spaced pages (approximately
7500 words). Submit two paper copies and one copy on a 3.5" diskette in WordPerfect or ASCII
text. All citations should follow the author-date system in the Chicago Manual of Style, with endnotes
used for explanatory text (legal articles may use Bluebook format). Tables and graphics should be
camera-ready Please include the author's name, address, telephone number, and email address, along
with a 2-3 sentence biographical sketch. Carolina Planning reserves the right to edit articles accepted
for publication, subject to the author's approval.
